

## DONOVAN MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

26 December 1944

The Donovan Plan, embodied in JCS 1181, was passed to the JIC for study, comment and recommendation. In the JIC it became something of a football which was kicked about by way of a series of proposals and counter-proposals for nearly two months. By the end of December these had clarified into two differing proposals, respectively labelled JIC 239/1 and JIC 239/2.

The memorandum here included represents a brief interim report to the President by General Donovan just before he was to take off on one of his frequent field trips.

For the sake of brevity this memorandum has been inserted rather than the very extended minutes of the JIC which record the full discussions of the members.

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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As I am leaving today, I vanted to let you know of the present status of the memorindum proposing the establishment of a central intelligence ervice.

It was referred by the JCS to the JIC for comment and recommendation through the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

The JIC Committee has produced two counter proposals:

by representatives of the military agencies and the other by

contatives of State, FEA, and OSS. These two counter ro
ls differ from each other so fundamentally in approach, con-

Both papers are to be presented to the Joint Strategic Eurwey Committee. The proposal of the civilian agencies closely follows the original proposal to you. It is based upon the premise that the end product of intelligence activity must be a complete synthesized estimate upon which policy with reject to the national accurity as a whole may be safely based.

Thile a proving the pointment of the Director by the resident, as suggested by me, the civilian paper would have the Director instead of reporting to the President, reporting to the Approved For Release 2002/19/19 CAR DESCRIPTION 000100200004-1

Ecard, consisting of the Secretaries of ter, State, and Mary.

The Board would set the policies but the Director would have the administrative power to carry them out.

The projosal of the military mealers is not yet finalized.

As now drafted it evades early action. It is concerned primarily with national security in its narrow sense. Strictly military in its concept, it a prosches the problem of providing mitional policy intelligence from the departmental point of view. It provides for a minimum of centralization and so undertaken to restrict the authority of the Director show they wish a pointed by the Cabinet Secretaries, acting jointly.

The effect of this paper rould eliminate little of the exiting confucion. At the request of the Etrategic Survey Board I
speared before it and explained the theory underlying the princry
paper and the senner of administration.

that they recognize the necessity of establishing such as ten but once the Director is appointed by the President they ask that he report to the board rather than to the President. The ground taken is the inadvisability of having so many individual agencies reporting directly to the President. I stated that this was a matter for Presidential decision.

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offered no objections to this but insisted that, whatever the composition of the Board, the Director be free administratively to run his job, responsible as is a general manager to a Board of Directors. I talked also to State about this and they feel they must be consulted in the selection of the Director.

In discussing this matter with responsible officers in the intelligence field I have been surprised at their lack of understanding of the necessity for a gound intelligence organization, an organization comprising a central service in which career officers and civilian experts working together synthesize all available intelligence on the policy level, and estimate, before the event, political and military developments.

William J. Donovan Director